“The riding agreement was broken by the New York Philharmonic`s decision to go to Carnegie Hall,” said Reynold Levy, president of Lincoln Center, in August, two months after the Philharmonic`s plans were announced to move. Beadle, R., Moore, G. (2006). MacIntyre on virtue and organization. Organizational studies,27 (3), 323-340. MacIntyre, A. (1999). Dependent rational animals: Why man needs virtues. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Once a person has developed reason, his or her role is to perform “appropriate actions” or “good functions.” Stoics have defined an appropriate act as “what convinces you” or “what is done admits that a reasonable justification is due.” The preservation of one`s own health is cited as an example. Since health is neither good nor bad in itself, but can be used right or wrong, the decision to preserve health, for example by harming oneself by walking, must be consistent with all other acts of the product.

Similarly, the victim of his own property is an example of an act that is only appropriate in certain circumstances. The conduct of appropriate acts is only a necessary and not sufficient condition for virtuous action. This is because the agent must have a good understanding of the actions he has taken. In particular, his selections and refusals must constitute a continuous series of actions in harmony with all virtues at the same time. Each act represents the whole and harmony of its moral integrity. The vast majority of people are not virtuous because, although they can properly follow reason in their tribute to their parents, they do not respect, for example, the “laws of life as a whole” by acting appropriately in relation to all other virtues. MacIntyre (1983, p. 10) distinguishes rights under the rules of practice by saying, “Natural rights… are compared to at least three other types of rights: those rights conferred on classes of individuals and sometimes on persons designated by the positive law enacted in sovereign states or by customary law in some previous societies; The rights arising from the practice of the promise; and the rights enjoyed by practices under behavioural rules. MacIntyre (1983, p. 10) also stresses that it is essential that natural rights be contrasted with these other types of rights, as “natural rights were intended to establish a standard independent of all positive lands or promises and specific institutionalized social roles, status and practices.” Because of this opposition, that is, because the rights conferred by practices are not abstract from the social context, they are not subject to the criticism that MacIntyre (1983, p. 15, 18) addresses to natural rights theories.

Hohfeld (1913) argues that the discourse on rights is often confused and mixes different conceptions of rights. Thus, its framework of a different meaning from the notion of a right; For the purposes of this article, this framework helps to explain how intrinsically relational commitments (Thompson 2004), characteristics of the virtue of justice, determine workers` rights in the context of productive practices.